
ARTICLES

Bretton T. Alvaré*Widener University***“Babylon Makes the Rules”: Compliance, Fear,
and Self-Discipline in the Quest for Official NGO Status**

As untrained social agents endeavor to create new, grassroots nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), they quickly discover that in order for their nascent organizations to gain official status, and thus enjoy the benefits that come with it, they must first do the compliance necessary to register with the government agency or agencies responsible for regulating and monitoring their practices. Although it may not be regarded as such, the official registration process is more than just a means to an end; it has the power to produce new subjectivities that organize and constrain the social experience of NGO activism. As discontented citizens attempt to realize their unique visions of social justice by entering the field of NGO-based social activism, they “fall into” a habitus that disposes them to certain patterns of thought and behavior while rendering other patterns undesirable. This article uses ethnographic accounts of the evolution of a local development NGO founded and administered by Rastafari elders in Trinidad, West Indies, to illustrate how this habitus, a product of the iterative experiences surrounding the establishment and maintenance of an official NGO, structures the way grassroots social activists, with little or no prior administrative experience, understand, and respond to the problems and situations they encounter as they attempt to create their own NGOs. [Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Trinidad, Tobago, Rastafari, habitus, development]

Amidst the ongoing explosion of registered nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) throughout the developing world, informal voluntary associations are increasingly feeling the need to take on the trappings and status of “official” NGOs. State governments are actively advancing this trend by making ever-increasing budget allocations to the NGO sector and trumpeting the inherent beneficence of a vibrant, autonomous civil society.¹ Their ostensible motives may be to encourage “civic empowerment” and “participation” (Sharma 2006:62–63), but it is well documented that the cultivation of the NGO sector is part of a larger project of “privatization” (Karim and Leve 2001) by which nation-states devolve the risks and responsibilities of governance onto individual citizens and the civil society organizations in which they become involved (Alvaré 2009; Ferguson and Gupta 2002:989; Fisher 1997; Gill 2000; Goode 2006; Hale 2002:496; Paley 2002:48).

The unprecedented proliferation of NGOs in the developing world indicates that ever-widening circles of would-be social activists are experiencing the trials and tribulations surrounding the establishment and maintenance of NGOs (Kamat 2003).

In a nod to the ubiquity of the NGO model, even self-proclaimed “revolutionaries” and “enemies of the state” with little formal education or prior administrative experience are attempting to advance their agendas by creating their own NGOs (Alvaré 2009). These fiercely impassioned, yet untrained, revolutionary social activists are contributing to the tremendous diversity of organizations that share the increasingly vague “NGO” classification by attempting to construct radical NGOs with socially progressive missions and unique organizational structures informed by their own particular visions of social justice (Fisher 1997:447).

As they endeavor to create new, grassroots² NGOs dedicated to the pursuit of social justice, revolutionary social activists soon realize that before an NGO can legitimately pursue its principle objectives, its leaders must register with the appropriate government agencies; recruit and maintain staff; network with foreign contacts, local community leaders, and other NGOs operating in the region; develop a formal organizational structure; adopt bylaws; access elite technology; and, most importantly, raise the funds necessary to do the work (Richard 2009:172; Schuller 2007:80). While these activities may be regarded as trivial and largely independent of an NGO’s primary mission, for grassroots NGOs with limited operating budgets, they can end up consuming the majority of staff members’ time and energy and even lead to the “death” or “failure” of an NGO (Adkins and Kemper 2006; Edelman 1999:187; Petras and Veltmeyer 2007; Riles 2000; Schuller 2007).

Such was the case for the National Rastafari Organization (NRO) of Trinidad and Tobago,³ a loose collection of Black Power guerrillas turned Rastafari warriors from Trinidad’s historically revolutionary southern oilfields who attempted to bring social justice to their local community by founding their own development NGO. In 2004, nearly three decades after being scattered by the Trinidadian government’s violent campaign against their guerrilla army, the National United Freedom Fighters (NUFF),⁴ three former brothers-in-arms came together on the same piece of land from whence they had launched their most daring operations, and determined to renew the quest for progressive social change they had begun during the Black Power Revolution that engulfed Trinidad in the early 1970.⁵

Where, as armed combatants, they had drawn inspiration from the violent tactics of Che Guevara, the Mau-Mau, the Viet Cong, and other contemporary revolutionaries, they now framed their goals and strategies in terms of the spiritual ideology and discourses of Rastafarianism (henceforth, Rastafari⁶). Their broadly defined aim—to improve the material conditions and opportunities available to members of their local community—was the same as when they “took up the gun” in 1972, but they determined to pursue it in a very different way. By creating a legitimate, registered community-based organization grounded in their Rastafari faith, they would expand the economic and educational opportunities available to community residents by offering them free job placement services, basic healthcare, computer literacy, and access to anticolonial literature.

These three men, self-described as “enemies of the state,” still bore the emotional and physical scars of the injustices visited upon them by the state in the 1970s, and their fiery antigovernment rhetoric soon drew the support of other former Freedom

Fighters to their organization, which quickly gained popularity among members of the local community— Rasta and non-Rasta alike—hungry for the dignity and pride offered by their modest programs. Although most had never taken up arms with the NUFF in the 1970s, they had provided the young guerrillas food, shelter, medicine, *ganja* (marijuana), and protection as they evaded the authorities. The NRO's revolutionary tack also resonated with members of younger generations who, despite being too young to have participated in Trinidad's Black Power Revolution firsthand, had grown up learning they were the inheritors of a local tradition of insurrection that stretched back to the labor uprisings of the 1930s (Neptune 2007:32–42; Singh 1994:165–174) and that their state of economic deprivation was the result of intentional neglect by the ruling People's National Movement (PNM) regime in retaliation for their community's long history of challenging state authority (see Hintzen 1989). Resurrecting inclusive discourses of blackness forged during the Trinidadian Black Power Revolution, which appealed to Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians alike, and couching them in the antiracist teachings of Haile Selassie I, whom most Rastafarians regard as the living God, the NRO framed an ambitious development program designed to address both the material and cultural poverty of the community.

This article examines how, in an effort to legitimize and expand their fundraising activities, the NRO threw itself into the maelstrom of the formal NGO registration process, which subsequently dramatically altered their revolutionary social vision. The unanticipated demands of official state registration exposed the NRO to new guidelines for action that disposed them to reevaluate their definitions of social justice and “fall into” new patterns of NGO practice (Bourdieu 1990:90). Their experiences convinced the NRO's leaders that violating the rules for legitimate NGO-based activism established by the state could potentially draw the attention of government authorities with the power to derail their entire project. They had to struggle with difficult dilemmas and choices regarding how to adapt their radical social development strategies and reconfigure the NRO's organizational structure to comply with government regulations.

The following analysis illustrates how the process of official registration forced the NRO's leaders to consider a hitherto unimagined range of possibilities, situations, and contingencies related to their social activism. They realized that in order to meet the requirements, they would have to reconcile their own revolutionary approach to social development with those permitted and encouraged by the state (Richards 2009:171). The NRO's leaders developed new strategies for achieving social justice, which they then implemented in the interest of attaining official NGO status.

The seemingly mundane process of state registration incited feelings of fear, self-doubt, and anxiety that disposed the revolutionary social activists who founded and operated the NRO to embrace new regimes of self-discipline in order to preclude a largely imagined threat of state surveillance and repression. I propose that these emergent patterns of thought and behavior can best be understood as a kind of habitus that structures the way revolutionary social agents understand and respond to the problems and situations they encounter in the continual operation of an activist NGO. In an effort to extend recent anthropological scholarship that seeks to avoid

reifying NGOs and their professed ideologies (Schuller 2009:85; Trouillot 2003), I focus on NGO practices – and specifically on the processes by which organizations define and prioritize their development goals, the particular actions they take in pursuit of those goals, and the relationships they establish with the local community members they intend to serve.

The research on which this article is based represents an attempt to implement Carole Yawney's (1999) suggestion that, in light of the transnational dynamic of the Rastafari movement and its well-known history of misrepresentation by academics, fieldwork among the Rastafari community should be long term, multisited, and include collaboration with the subjects themselves. My fieldwork involved 24 months (March 2005-March 2007) of participant observation and interviews with administrators, staff, and local constituents at the NRO headquarters in South Village,⁸ Trinidad, the NRO U.S. office in western Massachusetts, and at fundraisers the organization held in various locales in the northeastern United States. Throughout the course of my research I served as a member of the organization's U.S.-based staff and accompanied the NRO's leaders and other staff as they traveled between these locations. My position as a staff member enabled me to document the organization's official and unofficial publications, internal communications, and administrative meetings. As the NRO matured, I was able to directly observe the evolution of the strategic process by which it recruited new members, interacted with agents of the state, raised capital, and implemented its local development programs.⁹

State Regulation of NGO-based Social Activism

In the United States and Trinidad, specific national government agencies—the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Ministry of Community Development, Culture, and Gender Affairs (MCDCGA), respectively—are responsible for defining the parameters of acceptable NGO activism. What makes an NGO “official” is not whether it effectively performs its intended functions but, rather, whether these government agencies recognize it as official and confer upon it official status. In essence, an NGO is only “real” or “legitimate” if it is regarded as such by those with the power and authority to regulate it, monitor it, and shut it down. The “official” NGO designation bestows activist organizations with critical rights and privileges, such as tax-exempt status, and enables them to legally solicit and accept public and private funding (Schuller 2007:78). In order to gain official status and the coveted right to proclaim, “Your donations are tax deductible!”¹⁰, NGOs must comply with rigid regulations set forth by government agencies embedded in larger state bureaucratic apparatuses. The practices associated with official state compliance, and the conflicts and dilemmas these produce, comprise a fundamental aspect of NGO-based social activism.

The official registration process mandated by the IRS and MCDCGA represents a kind of rite of passage by which social activists are formally initiated into the social field of NGO administration. As they interact with these government agencies, NGO activists learn some basic rules of legitimate NGO-based activism and the consequences for violating them, initiating a process of transformation by which even the most revolutionary social activists are converted into self-regulating

citizen-subjects willing to pursue certain courses of action, but not others. They are forced to make important decisions in order to comply with the IRS's and MCDCGA's specific definitions of how registered NGOs should operate. Through the seemingly mundane process of registration, radical NGO activists are made explicitly aware of the power and authority of the state apparatus, and are brought face-to-face with the fact that even though their organizations may be classified as nongovernmental, agents of the state will be monitoring them and holding them accountable for their actions.

The following case sheds light on the ways "dialectical processes of disciplining and self-identification are produced at the intersection of regulation by nation-states and individuals' attempts to circumvent or redirect control" in their active pursuit of better lives (Ong and Nonini 1996:25, see also Foucault¹¹). For NGO activists dedicated to social reform, the experience of negotiating and attempting to circumvent the terms of state regulation can produce new subjectivities and new forms of self-discipline and identification. Staff and administrators of radical organizations with revolutionary goals, like the NRO, emerge from the registration process changed by the knowledge of their own accountability to the state government(s) with which they have registered, although they may not recognize it. They acquire new outlooks and opinions and take on new attitudes toward existing and potential strategies for enacting social change.

It is more the apparent threat than the actual fact of state surveillance and regulation that impacts an organization's future course. How an organization reacts to this perceived threat depends on its members' structural positions and past experiences with agents of the state. For NGOs run by formally educated, upper- or middle-class professionals accustomed to being served and protected by their governments, the activities associated with registration and compliance may seem little more than a formality—mere paperwork to be completed in order for the organization to move forward. But for NGOs, like the NRO, run by marginalized, dispossessed activists whose past interactions with agents of the state have been characterized by violence, corruption, and intimidation, registering with the state can be a terrifying ordeal evoking fear and uncertainty. The experiences of the NRO illustrate that, far from being a simple, mundane task, the official registration process can lead to conflict, disillusionment, and the drastic revision of previously conceived goals, practices, and policies.

Articulating a Revolutionary Vision of Social Activism

The activists who founded, administered, and operated the NRO had no previous experience with NGOs, yet, in a nod to the ubiquity of the NGO model, when faced with the decision of how to best address the social problems plaguing their hometown these *bredren* (devoted Rastafari brethren, plural or singular) eventually chose to launch their own NGO. They envisioned themselves as carrying on the same revolutionary struggle for social justice they had first taken up as part of the NUFF. Fed up with the state of education, healthcare, unemployment, and sanitation in their community, these lifelong friends took it upon themselves to create an organization devoted to a vision of social justice inspired by their deep commitment to Rastafari,

which would provide a program of material and mental uplift to the residents of South Village.

The bredren intended the NRO to be a revolutionary organization, not in the same sense as the NUFF but in the sense that it carried the potential to transform the social order of the community by helping to liberate South Villagers' "colonized minds." They outlined their motivations in the "NRO Handbook":

Our project is based on the research of colonial education and its effect on the Rastafari family and the multi-ethnic population of Trinidad & Tobago . . . For 500 years, we have been subjected to misguided and deliberate misinformation by Europeans and their African and Indian lackeys. They in turn have "sold" us into mental slavery. We have recognized that miseducation and misinformation has created a tremendous amount of disunity and falsehood amongst the population. Colonization has reaped its fruits and left us with the bare tree. If we continue to evaluate our progress and education based on the format of the European educational standards, we will continue to find ourselves being in the position of beggars. As miseducated and misinformed beggars, we will continue to generate underpaid and undereducated slave labor disguised as free people. It is with the attitude of freedom of thought and expression and the right to equality and justice under universal natural law that we go into this project.

The notion that material and mental uplift necessarily go hand-in-hand is an essential feature of these bredren's Rastafari vision of social justice and is rooted in the teachings of the living God, His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, also referred to as Jah Rastafari. The bredren based their community development program on this concept and quoted His Majesty at length in their "Aims and Objectives":

The growth of a people is complex and interrelated. Man must be educated: he cannot come to grips with or cope with or understand the modern world unless he has been taught about it. He must be assured of a minimum economic security: he cannot concern himself with matters going beyond the day-to-day satisfaction of his physical needs unless he is fed and clothed and sheltered, nor can he acquire a sufficient degree of social consciousness to be able to subordinate his own personal interests to the good of the nation and the development of its society. Freedom, liberty, the rights of man—these mean little to the ignorant, the hungry, the ill-clothed, the badly housed.

When viewed in isolation, the NRO's mission does not appear to be revolutionary. Its aims and objectives are very similar to those of most development agencies—to provide education, skills training, and basic services to an impoverished community. However, when placed in the context of the Rastafari worldview, the revolutionary quality of the NRO's development program becomes evident.

The bredren were not concerned with promoting development for development's sake. Rather, they ran their organization with the firm belief that Trinidad, along with

the rest of the exploitative global capitalist system (symbolized by the key Rastafari concept of Babylon), was teetering on the brink of inevitable *downstruction* (total destruction). The following quote, which appeared in the NRO's monthly newsletter, *The Liberator*,¹² encapsulated their stance:

They have raped and plundered each other, and created all manner of idolization and beast worship, denying the truth and the right for the wrong and the lie. They have turned women into men and men into women, and developed weapons of mass destruction, man has committed genocide and taught lies and corruption to his children, and they have built their churches and universities from which they have graduated thieves, murderers and pedophiles. Now the hour is at hand, when they shall be judged according to their works, and no one shall escape the judgment, not even the dogs that piss upon the walls of Babylon shall escape.

The bredren considered the complete renunciation of Babylonian culture and society to be a prerequisite for surviving the coming apocalypse—"not even the dogs that piss upon the walls of Babylon shall escape"—which they estimated would take place in the immediate future. As committed Rastas, they felt a responsibility to not only anticipate and facilitate the downstruction of Babylon themselves, but also to give their fellow sufferers (oppressed, impoverished victims of Babylonian exploitation) an opportunity to save themselves both spiritually, by exposing them to the teachings of His Majesty, and physically, by providing them the skills necessary to survive outside of Babylon.

It was more the intent than the substance of the NRO's original development program that made it revolutionary. When viewed in light of the bredren's millenarian beliefs, the revolutionary promise of their plainly stated aims and objectives (listed below) becomes clear.

- (1) To educate the community about H. I. M Qedamawi Haile Selassie I. Abbajonhoi and propagate the teachings of H. I. M Haile Selassie I.
- (2) Introduce and promote appropriate agricultural techniques including organic regeneration of the land site.
- (3) To participate, promote and conduct cultural exchanges between Rastafari in different parts of the Caribbean and the world.
- (4) Carry out literacy programs, health education, sanitation as well as other environmental conversations.
- (5) To provide the opportunity where adults and young people can get basic education and skill training.
- (6) Promote and develop athletic and other cultural and recreational programs for the youth of the area.

By spreading the anticolonial, anti-imperialist message of Rastafari, and by interfacing with other Rastafari organizations around the globe, the bredren aimed to simultaneously strengthen the global Rastafari movement and weaken wicked Babylon by wresting sufferers, on whose lifeblood the *shit-stem* (global capitalist system)

depends, from her grasp. After freeing them from the “mental slavery” of Babylon, the NRO would then provide South Villagers with skills (literacy, sustainable agricultural techniques, and basic education and skills training in carpentry, construction, sewing, etc.) necessary to practice a more self-sufficient lifestyle with minimal interaction with Babylon in the shorter term, and to flourish as independent farmers or craftsmen after the Apocalypse. The “athletic and other cultural and recreational programs for the youth” would celebrate Rastafari values of fair play and mutual respect while providing an alternative to the Babylonian intervillage competitions organized by the government, which the bredren saw as part of a larger mission to “foster disunity and distrust” within the population. They were not simply trying to improve the sufferers’ day-to-day lives, they were attempting to advance the revolutionary goals of the global Rastafari movement—specifically, to erode the totality of Babylon by freeing the mental captives whose complicity in the system enables it to function.

The bredren created the NRO in order to contribute to the larger Rastafari project of expediting Babylon’s inevitable demise by exposing South Villagers to Rastafari ideology and giving them the skills to construct a Rastafari *livity* (spiritually informed lifestyle). Far from deluding themselves into believing that all those who participated in the NRO’s programs would join the revolutionary Rastafari struggle against Babylon, the bredren knew that while “many w[ould] be called, few w[ould] be chosen.” To those who refused to renounce their Babylonian lives and opted to remain in a state of mental slavery, the NRO would at least offer some basic healthcare, employment training, and trash bins to mitigate Babylon’s oppressive conditions until Judgment Day.

From Thought to Action: The Rise of the NRO

When I first linked with the NRO in March of 2005, the bredren had recently launched a website, and began publishing the NRO newsletter, *The Liberator*, online and in print. These were primarily the work of Ras Indra,¹³ drone of the three elderly bredren who founded the NRO, who has resided in western Massachusetts since he emigrated from Trinidad in the early 1980s. He regularly traveled to and from South Village, where the NRO’s other two founders, Ras Cudjoe and Ras Douglas, had lived their entire adult lives. Ras Indra provided the technical skills and modest financing that enabled the NRO to get off the ground. When I contacted Indra after coming across an issue of *The Liberator* online, he informed me that six months earlier he had purchased a nine-acre piece of land, in one of the many oilfields surrounding South Village, to serve as the site of the NRO’s headquarters and base of operations, an act of profound symbolic significance in the Caribbean Rastafari cultural tradition (Besson 1998:69–70).

After Indra finalized the land purchase, he and the bredren launched a number of modest programs for members of the local community. Their first task was to free the “colonized minds” of the sufferers in South Village. On their self-described “sacred ground,” they erected a small *True-brary* (as opposed to the English “liebrary”) featuring donated Afro-centric, anticolonial literature. They announced the

opening of the True-brary by inviting the entire community to attend a Rastafari Sports and Family Day that promoted friendly competition in an atmosphere of community solidarity. They also launched an initiative to clean up South Village's refuse-strewn streets by purchasing a number of barrels, painting them red, green, and gold, emblazening them with the NRO logo, and placing them throughout the town.

Following the success of these programs, the bredren put an advertisement in *The Liberator* offering any who were willing an opportunity to join their organization to attend a major *groundation* (Rastafari spiritual gathering) on the NRO land planned for July-August 2005. In addition to the local community, five bredren and one sistren from the United States, including myself, answered the call, and the conference, which featured speeches, Nyabinghi drumming, *ital food* (vegetarian food prepared according to the dietary restrictions of Rastafari), and a free health clinic for the residents of South Village, was a tremendous success. All in attendance were excited about the prospect of these well respected bredren defying all of the odds and providing the kind of grassroots social development and community solidarity South Village so desperately needed. Local farmers showed their support by contributing gifts of ganja, sugar cane, and other produce. Dozens of residents expressed their thanks and pledged to support the organization in any way they could. Around the village, attendees proudly wore buttons bearing the NRO logo and enthusiastically answered questions from passers-by who stopped them to inquire about the NRO. During the conference, the other U.S. visitors and I had to prove our devotion to the cause through hard work and respect for the local Rastafari elders. Working alongside other former Freedom Fighters from the village who had pledged themselves to the NRO, we dutifully performed the menial tasks that made the groundation possible—setting up chairs, running electrical wires, preparing and serving refreshments, greeting visitors, running errands, hanging tarps, and assisting the doctors and nurses who had volunteered their time for the health clinic.

On the last day of the trip, before we gathered to leave for the airport, the bredren offered us staff positions in the NRO. We were charged with the task of working with Indra to organize fundraisers in the northeastern United States, the proceeds of which would be transferred to South Village to fund the NRO's development programs. Our commitment would be completely voluntary and we would all be free to contribute as much or as little time and energy to the organization as we wished. All present accepted the offer, and we returned to the United States energized, encouraged, and ready to start raising funds. Upon our return to the United States, the bredren crafted a fundraising system intended to collect money from Rastafari sympathizers in wealthier nations to fund programs for the sufferers in South Village. Donations from members of the online Rastafari community who subscribed to *The Liberator* would make up one funding source. The remainder of the organization's funds was to be raised by tapping the affluent but progressive Rastafari social networks in which Indra had become enmeshed while living in the United States. Years of hustling in western Massachusetts had enabled him to link with local reggae musicians, artists, writers, intellectuals, merchants, organizers, and spiritual leaders sympathetic to the Rastafari worldview. He planned to transform this social

capital into a financial support base for the NRO's local development programs in Trinidad.

During the next twelve months, I worked as part of the support staff at four of the six fundraisers put on by the NRO in the northeastern United States. All of the fundraisers followed a similar format. In exchange for a small donation (sometimes required, sometimes not, depending on the quality and notoriety of the music act), attendees would be treated to a night of Rastafari-themed cultural performance—lectures, music, and video presentations. Indra would sell concessions, like ital food, Rastafari flags, buttons, pins, books, and photos of His Majesty, inside the venue to raise additional funds. All told, the six events the NRO held from September 2005 to June 2006 raised approximately \$2,500. These meager profits were deposited into what Indra jokingly referred to as the NRO's "phantom budget," which was used to support the ongoing maintenance of the land, the continuing operation of the True-brary, and the periodic staging of free events on the NRO land in Trinidad. Encouraged by the popular success of these modest programs, the bredren began to imagine the possibility of launching larger, more capital-intensive projects.

Transformations: The Quest for Official NGO Status

When we returned to South Village to host the NRO's second annual groundation in July 2006, the bredren called a meeting to inform the U.S.-based staff that the time had come for the NRO to register as an official NGO. They conceded that while we had already accomplished much as an informal group of volunteers working with a phantom budget, the time had come to take things to the next level in terms of fundraising and, by extension, local community development by transforming the NRO into an "official NGO." "We are becoming much more visible . . . more well-known. . . but you can only do so much giving people books to read and free reading glasses and trash barrels and health clinic," Indra said, referring to the NRO's existing social development efforts. So far, the NRO's programs had been small and cheap enough to implement "under the radar," but if they wanted to raise "big money" and apply for building permits and the like, they felt they had to apply for official NGO status.

As we sat around the fire, Indra instructed the U.S.- and Trinidad-based staff that in order to pursue official NGO status, the NRO would have to undergo a practical, discursive, and structural transformation. He had already taken a crucial first step in this direction during an interview he gave to a national radio station to spread the word about the second annual groundation. In his statements, he had been careful to discursively represent the NRO as an inclusive grassroots organization with values in line with the positive multiculturalist social vision promoted by the Trinidadian government (Green 1999), "where every race has an equal place"¹⁴ and civic participation is constructed as the key to national development:

We're having our second annual seminar . . . all are welcome . . . this is not just a Rastafari thing . . . we have to involve the whole community . . . this is a community development organization . . . its not just Rastafari

education, its across the board. Haile Selassie I told us it was our duty to pull each other up, to pull the less fortunate up so we can all be equal . . . its our job as citizens to pull each other up . . . we as citizens have a responsibility. . . if we as citizens don't take this upon ourselves, who will? Because if we don't do it as citizens, together, it's not going to get done.

This rather generic, innocuous self-representation contrasted sharply with that presented in *The Liberator*, which located the NRO at the center of the struggle to destroy Babylon. Indra revealed that beyond simply trying to attract more people to the groundation, he had meant for the interview to reach the ears of members of the highest echelons of the national government. "We have the Prime Minister's ear now," he said assuredly, "They can't ignore us anymore. . . . Our next step is to find out the government agencies and prepare a letter that can go to all of those agencies." Official government recognition was regarded as a prerequisite for obtaining the funds necessary to expand the NRO's modest existing community development program.

To have a chance to compete with other NGOs to get these funds, the bredren agreed, would require the NRO to adopt the structure, discourses, and practices associated with the professionalized NGO model. "That is why we need to do everything to a T. To dot we I's and cross every T," Indra said. "Everything that goes out of here is going to need to be checked 2, 3, 4 times by different people inside. . . . That is why up here [on the land] needs to stay [under control]. We have to have everything in order before we can approach them." The bredren felt the organization's informal approach had to be refined. Our previous efforts could be useful insofar as documentation of the fundraisers and events held in the U.S. and South Village might enhance the NRO's applications for funds from public and private granting agencies. "We're now at the stage where we can begin applying for grants, small grants. We have photos and things we can show them to substantiate our requests," Indra said. Everything the NRO had hitherto achieved was reduced to a prelude to the "real works," which had not yet begun.

In November 2006, I traveled to Ras Indra's *gates* (home) in western Massachusetts. The entire U.S.-based staff was in attendance, preparing for a fundraiser scheduled at nearby Hampshire College the next day. Everyone gathered around the table in Ras Indra's cluttered dining room to share a big West Indian meal. Photographs and drawings of His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I, watched over us as we dined on *roti* (Trinidadian flatbread) and pumpkin, laughing and joking about the last service trip to Trinidad. As the meal wound down, Ras Indra bubbled some milky "bush tea" and the conversation turned to a reasoning on NRO business. As smoke swirled lazily beneath the cracked ceiling overhead, I-liza, the white Rasta sistren from Ohio who served as the NRO's de facto "secretary," observed that while we had staged a number of successful fundraisers during the past few months, we had yet to complete the application for official 501(c)(3) status in the United States—IRS Form 1023.

Applying for NGO status in Trinidad had been a simple formality—a one-page document asking for the organization's name, purpose, and a list of officers; so when

I-liza dropped the 28-page form on the table, the mood changed dramatically. From its size and appearance, everyone could see this was clearly a binding document that would no doubt be reviewed and scrutinized by committed agents of Babylon with no respect for Rastafari livity. For their part, half of the people in the room had hardly laid eyes on an IRS Form before. In the words of these Rastamen, voluntarily submitting information to the U.S. government was an exercise in “madness” that could only end badly. They did not want their names to appear on the form at all. “We’ll pop up on the grid,” they warned.

Eventually, it was agreed that the form should be filled out and submitted, but that all responses should remain as vague and cryptic as possible. As in a police interrogation, they would conceal their true intentions and tell “The Man” only what he wanted to hear, nothing more. After all, this was merely an unpleasant, but necessary, means to an end. With subscriptions to the newsletter growing every day and half-a-dozen fundraisers planned for the next six months, they did not want to risk losing everything they had accomplished so far by neglecting a silly government form. Besides, official nonprofit status would make the organization eligible to apply for government and private grants in the United States.

But as they got down to the business of filling in the form, remaining detached proved exceedingly difficult. This seemingly benign registration process forced everyone to rethink the existing, organic, largely personality- and commitment-driven structure of the NRO and to reconceptualize the organization in terms of the dictates and demands of the state. On the one hand, they were just doing it to get themselves into a better position to pursue their development goals. On the other hand, IRS Form 1023 required them to consider questions and contingencies they had never before imagined. What if someone wants to resign? What if new members want to join? Will they be charged a fee? What is the annual dues system, when do they need to be paid, and what is the penalty for late or nonpayment? Will all members have to pay dues? What about the sufferers (impoverished residents) in South Village? Will making those members pay dues defeat the purpose of the organization? What are the different classes of members? What is the end of the fiscal year? What date will the annual meeting be held? How often will board members be elected and what are the responsibilities of each officer? What are the voting rules? What are the rules for dismissal? These questions could not be ignored. IRS Form 1023 demanded that they be answered. As the hours wore on, the atmosphere in Ras Indra’s living room became apprehensive. Despite Ras Indra’s insistence that the exercise was “just paperwork,” imaginings of the NRO’s future were being reshaped behind everyone’s eyes.

For the most part, the group deferred all of the important decisions to Ras Indra. He was the charismatic *de facto* head of the organization, and we had learned on our first trip to Trinidad not to question his authority. But it soon became strikingly apparent that Ras Indra found the entire exercise even more uncomfortable and confusing than the rest of us. In retrospect, this should not have been a surprise as he, the most established Rastafari bredren in the room, was engaged in a practice–official state registration–that was decidedly “un-Rasta.” Nonetheless, this may have been the first time any of us had seen Ras Indra in a situation where he did not have

all the answers. He had cemented his status as a Rastafari elder not only by virtue of his uncompromising commitment to the principles of Rastafari, but also through authoritative demonstrations of his ability to “speechify” on virtually any subject of significance to the Rastafari nation (Chevannes 1994:227; Edmonds 1998:350). Both our positions as novices and Indra’s position as an elder were predicated on his superior capacity for reasoning.¹⁵ And yet the IRS Form demanded deliberation on many topics, like boards of directors, annual meetings, election procedures, that could only be described as “unreasonable,” at least from a Rastafari perspective.

As the night wore on, Indra increasingly deferred to I-liza for responses to the IRS form’s unreasonable questions. After all, she worked as a secretary in a law firm and had identified and obtained the forms needed to register with the IRS. Uncomfortable in this decision-making role, I-liza preferred to relay “standard” or “common” answers to given items on the form rather than appearing to assert her authority over Ras Indra’s. Given the vastly divergent structural positions of I-liza, a white, college-educated Rasta from the American Midwest, and Ras Indra, a self-described “enemy of the state” with fewer than seven years of formal schooling and no experience with government forms, the decision-making process that accompanied the experience of official registration with the IRS worked to curiously invert the NRO’s internal administrative hierarchy. Ras Indra’s name, the organization’s true leader, did not even appear in the NRO’s organizing documents. In the eyes of the IRS he was a nonentity. Faced with a lack of attendant staff members willing to commit their names and information to the forms, I found myself suddenly elevated to the position of “vice president.” Meanwhile, the Trinidadian bredren were completely excluded from this formative moment in the evolution of the NRO, not because their views were considered unimportant, but because, like everyone else, they regarded the registration process as inconsequential; a mere formality.

As Rastas, their knee-jerk reaction was to dismiss the entire exercise as foolishness. After all, they perceived the NRO as doing “Jah’s work” and were known to frequently proclaim, “What Jah brings together, no man can tear asunder.” Nonetheless, if the bredren wanted to do Jah’s work in the way they had envisioned, they believed they had no choice but to soldier on. So Indra and the U.S.-based staff grappled with the application until the early hours of the dawn, trying to come to grips with the demands and expectations of the IRS. For these untrained NGO activists, the experience of state registration was characterized by fear and worry: fear of losing everything they had worked for, and worry that their collective vision of the organization’s future might never become a reality. Fear and worry are potent emotions, and they generated new attitudes and dispositions in Ras Indra and the rest of the staff. The registration process planted the seeds of a new self-discipline that would blossom and take hold of these inexperienced yet well-intentioned NGO activists in the months that followed, disposing them to fall into hitherto unheard of courses of action.

The registration process only served to exacerbate the existing fears of state surveillance and repression present in the minds of the NRO’s leaders. Having experienced firsthand the full coercive power of the state during the NUFF’s armed struggle, they

were constantly wary of being violated by the police. In their speeches at the second annual groundation three months earlier, the bredren had warned of how the NRO's development program might be considered a threat by the government, an extension of the NUFF's revolutionary struggle, "because you are on ground owned by blood politics. This is Holy Ground! And we will create our school as an alternative school to the government. And we will threaten them the government in the type of mindset that we will be producing." The fears of state surveillance, heightened by the IRS registration process, were confirmed when, soon after, Ras Cudjoe was interrogated by members of the local police he found snooping around the NRO's land. Their visit surely had nothing to do with the NRO's application for official NGO status in the United States, but the physical presence of agents of the state on the NRO's sacred ground effectively shattered the organization's already threatened sense of autonomy.

Ras Indra expressed the bredren's growing sense of alarm in an internal communication he circulated soon afterward. "We had a visit from the police up at the HQ inquiring about the NRO and its intentions . . . so the word is that we monitor what we put in the newsletter . . . flags are up . . . but Jah is de boss." An article I had written criticizing the state of Trinidad's public education system was the first casualty of the NRO's new policy of self-censorship. Indra deemed it "too revolutionary" and refused to print it, but, up to that point, *The Liberator* had been just that: revolutionary. The bredren had regularly used it as an organ of protest to rail against the "leaders of the country [who] sip champagne and go into the parliament and throw plates and cups at each other and spend the country's money in building useless stadiums while the healthcare system is in shambles and one third of the population is living in poverty."¹⁶ A Rasta organization from France had recently written for permission to translate and reproduce articles from *The Liberator*, lauding it as "the best work we have ever read,"¹⁷ but the fear and worry aroused by the official state registration process disposed the bredren to abandon the revolutionary tack that had enabled *The Liberator* to gain so much currency among the global online Rastafari community.

When I protested Indra's decision to begin censoring *The Liberator*, his answer revealed the degree to which it stemmed from his longstanding fear of incarceration. "I am a Freedom Fighter but I am also a father. . . . It is important that I be able to be with my family, that is the number one priority right now." Indra even went so far as to indefinitely shut down the entire NRO website until the application for 501(c)(3) status was approved, fearing he might be punished for using the website to solicit donations without permission from the IRS.

In addition to prompting the suspension of the NRO website and the censorship of *The Liberator* for fear of being "blacklisted" by potential *baldhead* (non-Rastafari) donors or, worse, being arrested and imprisoned for "sedition," the registration process also led the NRO to implement a mandatory dues system by which all U.S.-based members would pay \$20 per month, to be added to the organization's general operating budget to fund works in Trinidad or finance additional fundraisers in the United States. Under the new dues system, Trinidadian members would not have to make any monetary

payments but would be required to contribute time and labor, ideally planting the land with crops to be sold at market.

Prior to the NRO's application for 501(c)(3) status and the subsequent implementation of the dues system, the U.S. members had just contributed as needed to help finance projects or fundraisers that were beyond the scope of NRO's "phantom budget." Financial contributions were appreciated but by no means expected. Once they were granted official titles and assumed the obligation of paying regular dues, some of the NRO's U.S.-based staff began to expect specific action from the sufferers in Trinidad. It was seen as "only fair" that they make tangible, demonstrable contributions of their own. Among both the American and Trinidadian members, formerly voluntary contributions and participation became obligatory. The U.S.-based staff, now "officers," felt endowed with the authority to issue directives to Trinidadian members with the expectation that they would be dutifully followed. Indra began to attribute delays and inaction to "illiteracy and ingratitude" on the part of the sufferers and the notion that "the local community only want[s] handouts." This attitude eventually led to irresolvable conflicts and alienated the people of South Village, whom the organization was meant to serve. The dues system drove a wedge between the U.S.- and Trinidad-based members, effectively destroying the organization's capacity to accomplish its development goals.

As the bredren committed themselves to attaining official NGO status, they transformed the NRO from a progressive, informal association of volunteers with a loose organizational structure based on traditional Rastafari eldership to a rigid, definitively hierarchical NGO with permanent offices, codes of conduct, set meeting dates, formal voting procedures, and a mandatory dues system that divided the membership into North American "givers" and Trinidadian "receivers" (Alvaré 2009:64). They abandoned the small-scale projects that had endeared them to the local community and became preoccupied with doing the compliance work necessary to pursue larger projects, which never materialized. No one forced the NRO to make these dramatic changes, yet not once in all the time I had worked with the organization had anyone suggested the creation of a dues system, the formation of different classes of members, or the self-censorship of *The Liberator*. The process by which they fell into these new practices reveals the subtle, transformative power of the seemingly mundane process of state registration. The practices and responsibilities involved in the formation and ongoing operation of an official transnational NGO, as opposed to a loose association of volunteers, raised new concerns and produced new forms of self-discipline that disposed the bredren to dramatically alter the ways they perceived and pursued their social development goals.

Implications of the Official Registration Process

In an era replete with anthropological descriptions of "state retrenchment" (Gill 2000), "imaginary states" (Ferguson and Gupta 2002), "nongovernmentality" (Jackson 2005), and the "erosion" or "decline" of state sovereignty (Held 1996), state agencies remain at the center of contemporary social and political struggles, especially

those mediated by supposedly autonomous NGOs (Edelman 1999:187). Regardless of whether their missions or goals can be classified as “revolutionary,” NGOs have to interact and negotiate with the government agencies responsible for monitoring, regulating, and, in some cases, funding their activities. The state is more than a hierarchically structured bureaucratic apparatus; it is a constructed entity “produced through bureaucratic practices, people’s interactions with officials, and public cultural representations” (Sharma 2006:62) whose effectiveness relies on particular imaginative and symbolic devices (Ferguson and Gupta 2002:984). Therefore, it is not only the direct actions of the bureaucratic apparatus, but citizens’ estimations of the power and capabilities of the state that enable it to rule (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001:211–214). In other words, what the state actually does is, to an extent, less significant than people’s imaginings of what it might do. Through the process of applying for coveted official NGO status, NGO leaders and staff members are forced to recognize their connections with state governments and realize the limits of their own supposed autonomy.

In working closely with a group of disempowered, dedicated social agents who constructed a grassroots development NGO to serve their own revolutionary social agenda, I have come to regard the official NGO registration process as part of a larger ongoing “legitimation project of the state” (Cohn and Dirks 1988:227), which generates a habitus that unsuspecting individuals “fall into” (Bourdieu 1990:90) as they enter the field of NGO-based social activism. This habitus, a product of the iterative experiences surrounding the establishment and maintenance of an NGO, provides guidelines by which committed activists evaluate and react to future events, strategize and accommodate to new situations, and innovate social practices (Seidman 1998:154).

For Bourdieu, “habitus is a socialized subjectivity” that is both produced by and generative of cultural practices that individuals engage in by virtue of their relationship to a certain “social field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:126). When activists create an NGO, they are drawn into a new social field where they must learn the rules for conduct as they go along. They fall into new patterns of thought and action and acquire new dispositions as they advance along the path to official NGO status. This new habitus structures the way revolutionary social agents understand and respond to the problems and situations they encounter in the continual operation of an NGO. They reevaluate and revise their preconceived notions about the social, political, or cultural issues they seek to address. They react to the structural barriers constraining potential courses of action as they become aware of them; reordering or discarding many of their initial priorities, and establishing new ones, which they then carry forward.

Among the defining features of a habitus is its “generative capacity” (Bourdieu 1990:12–13), the fact that it is both a product of social structure and “itself...a structure generative of social practices that reproduces social structures” (Seidman 1998:154). Accordingly, the habitus individuals acquire as they attempt to bring about social change by founding their own NGOs can lead them to reinforce or reproduce the very social conditions they initially set out to change, a tendency that has been well

documented in the anthropological literature on NGOs (see Paley 2002). Regarding this tendency as a product of a specific habitus linked to NGO-based activism helps account for NGOs' penchant for enacting palliative social change without seriously challenging the structural foundation of the status quo. NGO activists' socialized subjectivity precludes their taking any actions that might threaten the system that supports their organizations' functional existence. The case of the NRO reveals that it is not through direct force or coercion that states shear NGOs of their "radical excesses" (Hale 2002:496). Rather, they rely on subtler "technologies of power" (Cohn and Dirks 1988; Foster 1991:244; see also Foucault 1979), like classification (Williams 1989:435), certification, and registration, to generate a habitus that transforms revolutionary social activists into self-regulating subjects whose dependence on the existing social order renders radical social change undesirable.

The official registration process is more than just a means to an end. It has the power to produce new subjectivities that organize and constrain the social experience of NGO activism (Schein 2000:14). As well-meaning, progressive social activists struggle to attain official NGO status, they fall into a habitus that disposes them to certain patterns of thought and behavior while rendering others undesirable. This habitus buttresses the existing social order by compelling social agents to continuously reiterate its normative basis. As such, the seemingly mundane registration process can divert the creative energies of even the most revolutionary activists toward the preservation of the existing social order. The more they focus on the intricacies of state compliance, the less apt they are to maintain a revolutionary agenda entailing illicit or unconventional strategies for social change.

Like other anthropological accounts, this article attempts to theorize how individuals' definitions of social justice and their dispositions toward different strategies for achieving it, can be transformed, or compromised, by the process of NGO-based social activism. The case presented here calls into question the notion that such transformations can be regarded simply as unintended responses to external pressures exerted by states, markets, and local stakeholders. The NRO was not connected to powerful international donors and its initial, modest social development programs—the True-brary, health clinics, trash barrels, annual groundations—were appreciated and celebrated by the local community. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the organization was ever subject to direct scrutiny by state regulatory agencies, most likely the IRS and MCDCGA were hardly aware of it, much less concerned with policing it. Yet in order to legitimize their organization's existing fundraising schemes, gain access to additional public and private funding, and avoid the potential wrath of the state, the bredren felt compelled to pursue official NGO status and, in the process, dramatically altered the discourses, practices, and structure of their organization. These fateful transformations were not precipitated by threats, warnings, demands, or ultimatums from agents of the state. In terms of direct coercive action, the state never actually did anything to deradicalize the NRO. My goal in invoking Bourdieu's concept of habitus is to show that it did not have to. The fear and worry the seemingly mundane registration process evoked in these former Freedom Fighters as they entered the social field of legitimate NGO activism were powerful enough to generate new, positive dispositions toward a specific set of state-sanctioned organizational forms

and norms, which they then fell into, prompting their departure from their own visions and earlier strategies for producing social change.

Notes

Research for this article was supported by grants from the Temple University Graduate Fund for Excellence and a research fellowship from the Center for the Humanities at Temple University. I would like to thank Judith Goode, Patrick Gallagher, Mark Schuller, and Sangeeta Kamat for their thoughtful comments and encouragement during the composition of this article. I would also like to thank the editor, Elizabeth Mertz, and anonymous reviewers of *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* for their insightful critiques.

1. According to Trinidad and Tobago's current National Development Program, Vision 2020, the proliferation of NGOs in Trinidad and their increasing assumption of roles and responsibilities formerly under the control of the state are positive indicators of social development (Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago 2004:31).
2. The term *grassroots* is used to denote small-scale NGOs created and operated by and for the benefit of local community members.
3. The name of the NGO has been changed to protect individuals' privacy.
4. For a full account of the NUFF's armed struggle see Bernard (1995), Meeks (1999), and Millette (1995).
5. In Trinidad, the term *Black Power* had a very different meaning than in the United States, where it referred exclusively to African Americans. Because of the island's unique demography, the term *black* was applied to people of both African and East Indian descent. For a full account of the 1970 Black Power Revolution see Ryan and Stewart (1995).
6. *Rastafari* is the term preferred by my interviewees. They have distaste for "isms," which they associate with academia and Babylonian miseducation.
7. This is the term preferred by my interviewees.
8. The name of the location has been changed to protect individuals' privacy.
9. IRB approval for research involving human subjects was obtained prior to the commencement of fieldwork. Signed informed consent forms were obtained from all research participants. Interviewees were not compensated. Written permission was also obtained to monitor and reprint portions of NRO publications, meeting notes, internal communications, speeches, and documents, provided the identities of any individuals involved in the organization would be protected.
10. The NRO began printing this statement on handbills in anticipation of attaining official NGO status.
11. Clearly, the issues of self-disciplining and subjectivity discussed in this article connect with the Foucauldian paradigm, specifically the ongoing anthropological investigations of Foucault's notion of governmentality as it relates to the discourses, practices, and institutional structures of NGOs. However, because the Foucauldian paradigm has been well mined by other anthropologists, I do

not feel compelled to reexamine it here. My intention is not to overlook or disregard the vast anthropological literature on NGOs and governmentality, but rather to explore how a focus on the habitus concept might contribute to current understandings of the process of NGO activism. For discussions of neoliberal governmentality in which nongovernmental actors assume functions of state power, see Barry et al. (1996), Burchell (1996), Burchell et al. (1991), Ferguson and Gupta (2002), Hindess (2004), and (Rose) 1996.

12. The name of the newsletter has been changed to protect individuals' privacy.
13. The names of all individuals mentioned in this article have been changed to protect their privacy. In one previous publication (Alvaré 2009), the individuals referred to here as "Ras Indra" and "Ras Cudjoe" were identified by the pseudonyms "Ras Chaka" and "Ras Sundryata" respectively. I have changed the pseudonyms at their request.
14. This slogan is featured in Trinidad and Tobago's national anthem.
15. Reasoning is an open-ended dialogical discourse between two or more bredren that, assisted by the inspiration of ganja, stimulates the intersubjective exploration of truth (Yawney 1978:216). Reasoning sessions induct new initiates into the movement and confirm old adherents in the principles and precepts of Rastafari (Edmonds 1998:356). It is the process by which Rastas become steeped in the principles of "Rastology" (Nagashima 1984:116).
16. This quote came from an editorial by Ras Indra published in *The Liberator*.
17. This quote appeared in a personal e-mail to Ras Indra from the director of the French Rastafari website, www.reggae-live.com

References Cited

- Adkins, Julie, and Robert V. Kemper
 2006 Oasis Housing Corporation: From Solutions to Dissolution in a Faith-Based Organization. *Urban Anthropology* 35(2–3):237–264.
- Alvaré, Bretton
 2009 Fighting for "Livivity": Rastafari Politics in a Neoliberal State. *In Bridging the Gaps: Faith-Based Organizations, Neoliberalism, and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Tara Hefferan, Julie Adkins, and Laurie Occhipinti, eds. Pp. 51–68. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Barry, Andrew, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose
 1996 Introduction. *In Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Rationalities of Government*. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, eds. Pp. 1–18. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bernard, Eustace F.
 1995 *The Freedom Fighters*. Port of Spain: Caribbean Imprint Series.
- Besson, Jean
 1998 Religion as Resistance in Jamaican Peasant Life. *In Rastafari and Other African-Caribbean Worldviews*. Barry Chevannes, ed. Pp. 43–75. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

- Bourdieu, Pierre
1990 In *Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology*. Matthew Adamson, trans. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loic Wacquant
1992 *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Burchell, Graham
1996 Liberal Government and the Techniques of the Self. In *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism, and Rationalities of Government*. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, eds. Pp. 19–36. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds.
1991 *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault)*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Chevannes, Barry
1994 *Rastafari: Roots and Ideology*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Cohn, Bernard S., and Nicholas B. Dirks.
1988 Beyond the Fringe: The Nation-State, Colonialism, and the Technologies of Power. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1(2):224–229.
- Edelman, Marc
1999 *Peasants Against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Edmonds, Ennis B.
1998 The Structure and Ethos of Rastafari. In *Chanting Down Babylon: The Rastafari Reader*. Nathaniel Samuel Murrell, William D. Spencer, and Adrian A. McFarlane, eds. Pp. 349–360. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Ferguson, James, and Akhil Gupta
2002 Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality. *American Ethnologist* 29 (4):981–1002.
- Fisher, William
1997 Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 26:439–464.
- Foster, Robert J.
1991 Making National Cultures in the Global Ecumene. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 20:235–260.
- Foucault, Michel
1979 *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Gill, Lesley
2000 *Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life, and the Armed Retreat of the Bolivian State*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Glick Schiller, Nina and Georges Eugene Fouron

- 2001 Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long Distance Nationalism and the Search For Home. Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press.

Goode, Judith

- 2006 Faith-based Organizations in Philadelphia: Neoliberal Ideology and the Decline of Political Activism. *Urban Anthropology* 35:203–236.

Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago

- 2004 Vision 2020 Draft National Strategic Plan. Port of Spain, Trinidad: Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.

Green, Garth L.

- 1999 Blasphemy, Sacrilege, and Moral Degradation in the Trinidad Carnival: The Hallelujah Controversy of 1995. *In Religion, Diaspora, and Cultural Identity: A Reader in the Anglophone Caribbean*. John W. Pulis, ed. Pp. 189–214. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.

Hale, Charles R.

- 2000 Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights, and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala. *Journal of Latin American Studies*. 34(3):485–524.

Held, David

- 1996 The Decline of the Nation-State. *In Becoming National: A Reader*. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, eds. Pp. 407–417. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hindess, Barry

- 2004 Liberalism—What's in a Name? *In Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces*. Wendy Larner and William Walters, eds. Pp. 23–39. London: Routledge.

Hintzen, Percy C.

- 1989 The Costs of Regime Survival: Racial Mobilization, Elite Domination, and Control of the State in Guyana and Trinidad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jackson, Stephen

- 2005 “The State Didn't Even Exist”: Non-Governmentality in Kivu, Eastern DR Congo. *In Between a Rock and a Hard Place: African NGOs, Donors, and the State*. Jim Igoe and Tim Kelsall, eds. Pp. 165–196. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

Kamat, Sangeeta

- 2003 The NGO Phenomenon and Political Culture in the Third World. *Development* 46(1):88–93.

Karim, Lamia, and Lauren Leve

- 2001 Privatizing the State: Ethnography of Development, Transnational Capital, and NGOs. *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 24(1):53–58.

Meeks, Brian

- 1999 NUFF at the Cusp of an Idea: Grassroots Guerrillas and the Politics of the 1970's in Trinidad and Tobago. *Social Identities* 5(4):415–439.

Millette, David

- 1995 Guerrilla War in Trinidad 1970–1974. *In* The Black Power Revolution 1970: A Retrospective. Selwyn Ryan and Taimoon Stewart, eds. Pp. 625–660. St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies.

Nagashima, Yoshiko S.

- 1984 Rastafarian Music in Contemporary Jamaica: A Study of the Socioreligious Music of The Rastafarian Movement in Jamaica. Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Culture of Asia and Africa.

Neptune, Harvey R.

- 2007 Caliban and the Yankees: Trinidad and the United States Occupation. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Ong, Aiwha, and Donald M. Nonini

- 1996 Introduction: Chinese Transnationalism as an Alternative Modernity. *In* Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism. Aiwha Ong and Donald M. Nonini, eds. Pp. 1–34. New York: Routledge.

Paley, Julia

- 2002 Toward an Anthropology of Democracy. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31:469–496.

Petras, James, and Henry Veltmeyer

- 2007 The “Development State” in Latin America: Whose Development, Whose State? *Journal of Peasant Studies* 34(3):371–407.

Richard, Analiese M.

- 2009 Mediating Dilemmas: Local NGOs and Rural Development in Neoliberal Mexico. *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 32(2):166–194.

Riles, Annelise

- 2000 *The Network Inside Out*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Rose, Nikolas

- 1996 Governing “Advanced” Liberal Democracies. *In* Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, eds. Pp. 37–64. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ryan, Selwyn, and Taimoon Stewart, eds.

- 1995 *The Black Power Revolution of 1970: A Retrospective*. St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago: University of the West Indies Press.

Schein, Louisa

- 2000 *Minority Rules: The Miao and the Feminine in China’s Cultural Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Schuller, Mark

- 2007 Seeing like a “Failed” NGO: Globalization’s Impacts on State and Civil Society in Haiti. *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 30(1):67–89.
- 2009 Gluing Globalization: NGOs as Intermediaries in Haiti. *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 32(1):84–104.

Seidman, Steven

- 1998 *Contested Knowledge: Social Theory in the Postmodern Era*.
Oxford: Blackwell.

Sharma, Aradhana

- 2006 *Crossbreeding Institutions, Breeding Struggle: Women's Empowerment, Neoliberal Governmentality, and State (Re)Formation in India*.
Cultural Anthropology 21(1):60–95.

Singh, Kelvin

- 1994 *Race and Class Struggles in a Colonial State: Trinidad 1917–1945*.
Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph

- 2003 *Global Transformations: Anthropology and the Modern World*.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Williams, Brackette

- 1989 *A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Across Ethnic Terrain*. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18:401–444.

Yawney, Carole

- 1978 *Lions in Babylon: The Rastafarians of Jamaica as a Visionary Movement*. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, McGill University.
- 1999 *Only Visitors Here: Representing Rastafari Into the 21st Century*. *In Religion, Diaspora, and Cultural Identity: A Reader in the Anglophone Caribbean*. John W. Pulis, ed. Pp.152–182. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.